We study the recently introduced notion of a simulation-sound trapdoor commitment (SSTC) scheme. In this paper, we present a new, simpler de nition for an SSTC scheme that admits more e cient constructions and can be used in a larger set of applications. Speci cally, we show how to construct SSTC schemes from any one-way functions, and how to construct very e cient SSTC schemes based on speci c number-theoretic assumptions. We also show how to construct simulation-sound, non-malleable, and universally-composable zero-knowledge protocols using SSTC schemes, yielding, for instance, the most e cient universally-composable zero-knowledge protocols known. Finally, we explore the relation between SSTC schemes and non-malleable commitment schemes by presenting a sequence of implication and separation results, which in particular imply that SSTC schemes are non-malleable.
Introduction
The notion of a commitment is one of the most important and useful notions in cryptography. Intuitively, a commitment is the digital equivalent of a \sealed envelope." A party Alice would commit to a value by placing it into a sealed envelope, so that the value may later be revealed by Alice opening the envelope, but cannot be viewed by any other party prior to this opening (this is known as the \secrecy" or \hiding" property), and cannot be altered (this is known as the \binding" property). Commitments have been useful in a wide range of applications, from zero-knowledge protocols (e.g., 4, 15, 34] ) to electronic commerce (e.g., remote electronic bidding), and have been studied extensively (e.g., 3, 40, 41] ).
A commitment scheme is simply a method for generating and opening commitments. One can construct a formal de nition of security for a commitment scheme directly from the properties inherent in the intuitive description above. However, often these properties turn out to be insu cient when commitments are used as building blocks in larger protocols or when multiple commitments are used concurrently. This has motivated researchers to de ne and construct commitment schemes with additional properties. We discuss them brie y below.
A trapdoor commitment (TC) scheme is a commitment scheme with an additional \equivocability" property. Roughly speaking, for such a commitment scheme there is some trapdoor information whose knowledge would allow one to open a commitment in more than one way (and thus \equivocate"). Naturally, without the trapdoor, equivocation would remain computationally infeasible 4, 25, 2] .
A non-malleable commitment (NMC) scheme is a commitment scheme with the property that (informally) not only is the value v placed inside a commitment secret, but seeing this commitment does not give another party any advantage in generating a new commitment that, once v is revealed, can then be opened to a value related to v 22, 20, 29, 21, 17] . 1 Bell Labs { Lucent Technologies, 600 Mountain Ave., Murray Hill, NJ 07974. E-mail:
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y Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. E-mail: yangke@cs.cmu.edu. Part of the this research was done at Bell Labs. This research was also partially sponsored by National Science Foundation (NSF) grants CCR-0122581 and CCR-0085982. 1 The original de nition of 22] states (informally) that another party does not even have any advantage in creating a new commitment to a value related to v, regardless of the ability to open the new commitment. However, we will use the de nition based on opening.
A universally composable commitment (UCC) scheme is a commitment scheme with a very strong property that intuitively means that the security of a commitment is guaranteed even when commitment protocols are concurrently composed with arbitrary protocols 6, 7, 18] . To achieve universal composability, a commitment scheme seems to require equivocability, non-malleability, and furthermore, extractability. Roughly speaking, an extractable commitment scheme has a modi ed secrecy de nition, which states that there is a secret key whose knowledge would allow one to extract the value placed in a commitment. Naturally, without this knowledge, the value would remain hidden. We note that the notion of a UCC scheme appears to be strictly stronger than the other notions of commitment schemes. In particular, Damg ard and Groth 17] show that a UCC scheme implies secure key exchange, while both TC schemes and NMC schemes can be constructed from one-way functions.
Simulation Sound Trapdoor Commitment
In this paper, we focus our attention on another extension of commitment schemes, namely simulation sound trapdoor commitment (SSTC) schemes. An SSTC scheme is a TC scheme with a strengthened binding property, called simulation-sound binding. Roughly speaking, in an SSTC scheme, an adversary cannot equivocate on a commitment with a certain tag, even after seeing the equivocation of an unbounded number of commitments with di erent tags (i.e., the adversary may request an equivocation oracle to generate an unbounded number of commitments with di erent tags, and then to open them to arbitrary values). Here, a tag for a commitment is simply a binary string associated with the commitment.
The term \simulation soundness" was rst used to describe a property of zero-knowledge proofs by Sahai 47] , and intuitively meant that even though an adversary could see simulated proofs of incorrect statements, it could not itself produce a new simulated proof of any incorrect statement. Garay et al. 31 ] rst applied this term to trapdoor commitments. They gave a slightly stronger, although more complicated, simulation-sound binding property and an e cient construction based on DSA signatures. Their de nition was speci cally tailored to the goal of developing a universallycomposable zero-knowledge (UCZK) proof that was secure in the presence of adversaries that could adaptively corrupt parties. 2 Perhaps the most interesting feature of SSTC schemes is that they are both very powerful and very e cient to construct. As we will show later in this paper, SSTC schemes are non-malleable and can be used to construct simulation-sound, non-malleable, and/or universally composable zero-knowledge protocols. On the other hand, SSTC schemes can be constructed from one-way functions only, in contrast to UCC schemes, which are considered highly unlikely to be constructible from one-way functions alone 17]. Also, based on speci c number-theoretic assumptions (e.g., strong RSA, or the DSA assumption), very e cient SSTC schemes can be constructed, as we show in the paper. These constructions in turn yield UCZK protocols that are more e cient than all previously known ones, which are either based on UCC schemes 7, 18, 17] or on the previous de nition of SSTC schemes 31]. 3 
Summary of Results
Simpler De nition We provide a simpler de nition of SSTC schemes than the one by Garay et. al. 31 ].
Though the binding property in our de nition is weaker, it is still su cient in many applications (e.g., to construct UCZK protocols that are secure in the presence of adversaries that can adaptively corrupt parties). 2 They use the term identi er in place of the term tag, and intuitively, in their de nition 31], a commitment made by the adversary using identi er id is binding, even if the adversary has seen any commitment using identi er id opened (using an oracle that knows a trapdoor) once to any arbitrary value, and moreover, any commitment using identi er id 0 6 = id opened (again using the oracle) an unbounded number of times to any arbitrary values. 3 In fact, this (improved e ciency) is one of the main motivations to study the new simpler de nition of SSTC.
We also discuss various design issues in the de nition, and most notably, the choice between de nitions based on the tag of the commitment and on the body of the commitment. Informally, a tag-based de nition requires that an adversary cannot equivocate a commitment com with a certain tag so long as it does not see the equivocation of any commitment with the same tag. On the other hand, a body-based de nition requires that the adversary cannot equivocate a commitment com so long as the commitment com itself has not been equivocated. (Note that we use the term \body" to refer to the bit-string that is the commitment.) For brevity, a scheme secure according to the tagbased de nition will be called a tag-based scheme, and a scheme secure according to the body-based de nition will be called a body-based scheme.
In our paper, we choose to focus on tag-based schemes since they admit simpler constructions and seem to be the most appropriate for our applications. In particular, there exists a conversion from tagbased schemes to body-based ones with the addition of a one-time signature scheme. This is a rather common technique, and we discuss it later in the paper. We also show a rather general transformation from body-based schemes to tag-based ones. Furthermore, in constructing secure zero-knowledge protocols in the UC framework, where the communication is normally assumed to be authenticated, it is natural to use a tag-based scheme, setting the tag to be the pair of the identities of the prover and the veri er. In this way, one can avoid the overhead of the added one-time signature scheme caused by the tag-based scheme to body-based scheme conversion. We give more details later in this paper.
E cient Constructions We present various constructions of SSTC schemes. The rst construction is a generic one based on the (minimal) assumption that one-way functions exist. Our construction is similar to that of a UCC commitment scheme in Canetti et. al. 9 ]. However, because SSTC schemes do not require the extractability property, we are able to simplify the construction, and have it rely on a weaker assumption. The next two constructions are based on speci c numbertheoretic assumptions, namely the strong RSA assumption and the DSA assumption(see Appendix F). These two constructions are very e cient, both involving only a small constant number of public key operations. The construction based on DSA is similar to the one given by Garay et. al. 31] , but is about twice as e cient.
Interestingly, all of our constructions are heavily based on signature schemes that are existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks. We show that this is not a coincidence, in that there is a straightforward conversion of any SSTC scheme into a signature scheme.
Applications We show constructions of unbounded simulation-sound, unbounded non-malleable, and universally composable zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols using SSTC schemes in the common reference string (CRS) model. In particular, we show how to (1) convert a -protocol 13] (which is a special three-round, honest-veri er protocol where the veri er only sends random bits) into an unbounded simulation-sound ZK protocol; and (2) convert an -protocol 31] (which is a -protocol with a straight-line extractor) into an unbounded non-malleable ZK protocol, and further into a universally-composable ZK protocol. The constructions are conceptually very simple. In fact, they all share the same structure, and all use a technique from Damg ard 16] and Jarecki and Lysyanskaya 36]. The same technique was also used in Garay et. al. 31 ] in constructing a universally-composable ZK protocol that is secure against adaptive corruptions.
Our constructions are very e cient, and in particular our construction of a universally-composable ZK protocol is more e cient than previous constructions based on universally-composable commitment schemes 7, 9, 18] . First, we gain e ciency by using an SSTC scheme instead of a UCC scheme, since our most e cient SSTC constructions are more e cient than any known UCC constructions. For instance, the UCC constructions of 7, 9] are for bit commitments, and thus have an expansion factor of at least the security parameter. The UCC construction of 18] has constant expansion factor, but requires a CRS of length proportional to the number of parties times the security parameter.
Recently and independent from this work, Damg ard and Groth 17] presented a UCC scheme with a constant expansion factor with a CRS whose length is independent of the number of parties. However, their scheme is still quite complicated, since it requires interaction, and uses two di erent types of commitments, one a non-malleable commitment scheme, and the other a special \mixed commitment scheme." Second, we gain e ciency by avoiding the Cook-Levin theorem 11, 38]. 4 The second idea was used by Garay et. al. 31 ], who observed that one can construct honest-veri er zero-knowledge protocols with very e cient straightline extractors for many natural problems. They called these -protocols, and showed how to construct UCZK protocols from these -protocols in the CRS model without using the Cook-Levin theorem, thus achieving very e cient constructions. Intuitively, they managed this by \shifting" the burden of extractability from the commitments to the underlying -protocols. In particular, they used a technique involving signatures to convert anprotocol into a UCZK protocol secure against static corruptions, and then they used an SSTC scheme (with a stronger de nition than in this paper, as discussed above) to further convert the UCZK protocol secure against static corruptions into a UCZK protocol secure against adaptive corruptions. In this paper, we use an SSTC scheme (with the new de nition introduced in this paper) to construct UCZK protocols secure against both static and adaptive corruptions in the CRS model. Compared to that in 31], our construction is simpler and more e cient. The savings are twofold: the simpler SSTC construction (with a weaker de nition) cuts the overhead of SSTC by half, and the direct use of the tag-based scheme further eliminates the need for one-time signature schemes.
Relation to Non-malleable Commitments We discuss the relation between SSTC schemes and NMC schemes 22, 20, 21, 17] . 5 At rst glance, binding and non-malleability (or analogously, equivocation and malleability) seem like very di erent notions: while the former concerns the adversary's ability to open a commitment to multiple values, the latter concerns the adversary's ability to produce and open a commitment to a single value related to a previously committed value. However, they are actually closely related, and we shall show that simulation-sound binding implies non-malleability (when both are appropriately de ned). In fact, a similar observation was used implicitly in 20, 21, 17] to construct NMC schemes. In particular, these NMC schemes are all based on trapdoor commitment schemes that satisfy a weak notion of simulation-sound binding. (Note that these results all use body-based de nitions instead of tag-based de nitions.) However, the exact relationship between the notions of simulation-sound binding and non-malleability was not known, e.g., if simulation-sound binding is strictly stronger than non-malleability, or if they are equivalent.
We study the exact relationship between these two notions in this paper. To do this, we need to resolve some technical issues. First, just as SSTC schemes can be tag-based or body-based, NMC schemes can also be tag-based or body-based, where a tag-based NMC scheme is informally de ned as one in which seeing a commitment (to some value v) with a certain tag does not give an adversary any advantage in generating a new commitment with a di erent tag that can later be opened to a value related to v. Since we focus on tag-based SSTC schemes, we will focus on their relation to tag-based NMC schemes. 6 (Analogous results could be obtained for the relationship between body-based SSTC schemes and body-based NMC schemes.) Second, an SSTC scheme is a TC scheme, so to make a useful comparison, we consider non-malleable trapdoor commitment (NMTC) schemes. Third, since an adversary for an SSTC scheme is allowed to query an equivocation oracle, we will also consider NMTC schemes in which an adversary is allowed to query an equivocation oracle. 4 In previous constructions, they build a UCZK protocol L for an NP-complete language L (e.g. Hamiltonian Cycle or Satis ability), and then the UCZK protocols for any NP language is reduced to L via the Cook-Levin theorem, which is not very e cient. 5 Technically, when we refer to an NMC scheme, we will always mean an -non-malleable commitment scheme, following the notation proposed in 22]. 6 Tag-based NMC schemes are also related to UCC schemes. In particular, it can be shown that a UCC scheme is also a tag-based NM commitment scheme in which the tag is the identity of the committing party.
Finally, we re ne our de nitions of SSTC schemes and NMTC schemes by specifying the number of equivocation oracle queries an adversary is allowed to make. An equivocation oracle, on a commit query, produces a commitment g com and on an decommit query, opens g com to an arbitrary value. We say a TC scheme is SSTC(`), if it remains secure if the adversary is allowed to make at most`commit queries to the oracle (with no restriction on the number of decommit queries). We de ne NMTC(`) schemes similarly. We use SSTC (1) and NMTC(1) to denote the schemes where the adversary can make an unlimited number of commit queries. With the re ned de nitions (except for those related to the de nition in 17], discussed below), we shall then prove that, for any constant`, SSTC(`+ 1) is strictly stronger than NMTC(`) and NMTC(`) is strictly stronger than SSTC(`). (In particular, note that even an SSTC(1) scheme is strictly stronger than an NMC scheme, since an NMTC(0) scheme is at least as strong as an NMC scheme.) Furthermore, SSTC(1) is equivalent to NMTC(1). See Figure 1 . This makes it clear that the two notions, simulation-sound binding and non-malleability, are very closely related.
NMTC (1) -strictly imply -equivalent Figure 1 : The relation between SSTC and NMTC schemes
As mentioned above, the de nition of non-malleable commitments in Damg ard and Groth 17] (which they call reusable non-malleable commitments) does not quite t into the equivalence and separation results above. Their de nition states that seeing one or more commitments does not give another party any advantage in generating one or more commitments that can later be opened to values related to the values in the original commitments. However it can be shown that SSTC (1) implies a reusable NMC scheme. As mentioned above, one can characterize their construction of a reusable NMC scheme as constructing a trapdoor commitment schemes that satis es a slightly weaker notion of simulation-sound binding, and showing that this implies a reusable NMC scheme.
Preliminaries and De nitions
For a distribution D, we say a 2 D to denote any element that has non-zero probability in D, i.e., any element in the support of D. We say a R D to denote a is randomly chosen according to distribution D. For a set S, we say a R S to denote that a is uniformly drawn from S. If f and g are functions we say that f is eventually less than g, written f ev g, if there is an integer k 0 such that for all k k 0 , f(k) g(k). A function (k) is negligible, if it is eventually less than k ?c for any positive c. A commitment scheme is a two-phase protocol between a sender and a receiver, both probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines, that operate as follows. In the commitment phase, the sender commits to a value v by computing a pair (com; dec) and sending com to the receiver, and in the decommitment phase, the sender reveals (v; dec) to the receiver, who checks whether the pair is valid.
Informally, a commitment scheme satis es the hiding property, meaning that for any v 1 6 = v 2 of the same length, a commitment to v 1 is indistinguishable from a commitment to v 2 , and the binding property, meaning that once the receiver receives c, the sender cannot open the commitment c to two di erent values, except with negligible probability.
We will always assume that commitments are labeled with a tag tag. While this is not a factor in the security of basic commitment schemes, it will be useful in de ning certain enhanced commitment schemes, as will be obvious below. We also assume that there is a commitment generator function that generates a set of parameters for the commitment scheme. In other papers this is often referred to as a trusted third party or as the common reference string generation, 7 and it is especially important when we de ne trapdoor commitment schemes below. (We include it in the basic de nition to more conveniently de ne trapdoor commitment schemes.)
Finally, for readability in our formal de nitions, when we discuss distribution ensembles and negligible functions, we will often use the phrase \for all x" when we actually mean \for all sequences fx k g," where x k denotes a value of x dependent on the security parameter k, and of length polynomial in k. Formally, we de ne a commitment scheme as follows.
De nition 2. 7 We do not use the term \common reference string" in our de nition, since these parameters may be generated in a number of ways, and in particular, they may be generated by the receiver. In protocols where this value actually comes from a common reference string, we will make this clear.
Simulation-Sound Trapdoor Commitments
In 31], simulation-sound trapdoor commitment (SSTC) schemes were introduced, in order to construct a universally-composable zero-knowledge (UCZK) protocol secure against adaptive corruptions. Intuitively, they de ned an SSTC scheme as a trapdoor commitment scheme with a simulation-sound binding property that guarantees that a commitment made by the adversary using tag tag is binding, even if the adversary has seen any commitment using tag tag opened (using a simulator that knows a trapdoor) once to any arbitrary value, and moreover, any commitment using tag tag 0 6 = tag opened (again using the simulator) an unbounded number of times to any arbitrary values.
Here we introduce a simpler de nition for an SSTC scheme where the simulation-sound binding property is such that adversary can only succeed on a tag that has never been used in a commitment, rather than on a tag that has never been used in a commitment that has been decommitted in two di erent ways. 8 Since this can only reduce the success probability of the adversary, it is a weaker property. However, we will show that it also su ces for the desired application in 31], namely, for constructing UCZK protocols secure against adaptive adversaries. For the remainder of the paper, SSTC will refer to this new de nition, and SSTC(GMY) will refer to the old de nition of 31].
SSTC scheme based on any one-way function
Here we present an e cient SSTC scheme TC based on a signature scheme, which in turn may be based on any one-way function 46]. TC is the aHC scheme from Canetti et al. 9 ] with the following changes:
1. The underlying commitment scheme based on one-way permutations is replaced by the commitment scheme of Naor 40] based on pseudorandom generators (which can be built from any one-way function).
2. An extra parameter tag is included, and the one-way function f and corresponding NP language fyj9x s.t. y = f(x)g used in the underlying non-interactive Feige-Shamir trapdoor commitment 26] is replaced by the signature veri cation relation f((sig vk; tag); )j1 = sig verify(sig vk; tag; )g. 8 Note that in addition to the simulation-sound binding property being modi ed, our de nition of the underlying trapdoor commitment scheme is slightly di erent than the one given in 31].
In detail, the scheme goes as follows. TCgen(1 k ) generates a veri cation/signing key pair for a signature scheme (sig vk; sig sk) sig gen(1 k ). For a bit m, TCcom(sig vk; m; tag) uses the NP-reduction of the relation f(sig vk; tag)j9 s.t. 1 = sig verify(sig vk; tag; )g to the Hamiltonicity relation, to obtain a graph G (with q nodes) so that nding a Hamiltonian cycle in G is equivalent to nding .
Then it follows the aHC scheme of 9]:
To commit to 0, pick a random permutation of the nodes of G, and commit to the entries of the adjacency matrix of the permuted graph one by one, using Com (an underlying noninteractive perfectly-binding commitment scheme that produces pseudorandom commitments). To decommit, send and decommit to every entry of the adjacency matrix. The receiver veri es that the graph it received is (G).
To commit to 1, choose a randomly labeled q-cycle, and for all the entries in the adjacency matrix correspond to edges on the q-cycle, use Com to commit to 1 values. For all the other entries, produce random values. (These will be indistinguishable from commitments due to the pseudorandomness of the commitments.) To decommit, open only the entries corresponding to the randomly chosen q-cycle in the adjacency matrix. TCfakeCom(sig vk; sig sk; tag) computes the graph G associated with (vk; tag), computes = sig sign(sig sk; tag), and using nds a Hamiltonian cycle in G. Then it picks a random permutation of the nodes of G, commit to the entries of the adjacency matrix of the permuted graph one by one, using Com, and sets (G; HC(G)).
TCfakeDecom( ; com; v) runs as follows. If v = 0, it decommits using a normal decommitment to 0. If v = 1, it decommits using a normal decommitment to 1, using the Hamiltonian cycle HC(G) as the q-cycle.
To show the simulation-sound binding property, we show that if an adversary can break this property, we can break the underlying signature scheme as follows. (We assume that the underlying signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against an adaptive chosen-message attack.) Take a veri cation key sig vk and its corresponding signature oracle (from the de nition of existential unforgeability against an adaptive chosen-message attack). For each commitment to a value v using tag 0 , compute a signature on tag 0 using the signature oracle. From signature , one can compute a Hamiltonian cycle in G, and thus run TCfakeCom as above (except using the signature oracle to compute ) to produce a commitment com. To open a commitment c to a value m, run TCfakeDecom as above. Now say the adversary gives a double opening with tag, for which no commitment was requested, and thus no call to the signature oracle was made. In particular, say the adversary decommits to 0 and 1 for a commitment com. Then one can extract a Hamiltonian cycle in G, and thus a signature on tag, breaking the signature scheme. (from the de nition of existential unforgeability against an adaptive chosen-message attack). It is easy to see that the equivocation oracle, and in particular the commit queries to that oracle, may be implemented using the DSA signature oracle on the requested tag's. Now say the adversary gives a double opening with tag, for which no commitment was requested, and thus no call to the DSA signature oracle was made. In particular, say it gives openings (m; ) and (m 0 ; 0 ) of (g 0 ; c). Then To show the simulation-sound binding property, we show that if an adversary can break this property, we can break the Cramer-Shoup signature scheme as follows. (We assume that CramerShoup signatures are existentially unforgeable against an adaptive chosen-message attack.) Take a Cramer-Shoup key vk 0 and its corresponding signature oracle (from the de nition of existential unforgeability against an adaptive chosen-message attack). It is easy to see that the equivocation oracle, and in particular the commit queries to that oracle, may be implemented using the CramerShoup signature oracle on the requested tag's. Now say the adversary gives a double opening with tag, for which no commitment was requested, and thus no call to the signature oracle was made. In particular, say it gives openings (m; ) and (m 0 ; 0 ) of (y 0 ; e; c) with m > m 0 . Then (x 00 ) m?m 0 ( 0 ?1 ) e mod N and by e-one-wayness of the RSA encryption function, the value y such that y e x mod N may be computed. and he; y; y 0 i is a signature on tag, breaking Cramer-Shoup.
SSTC Signatures All three of our previous constructions of SSTC schemes are heavily based on signature schemes. In fact, this is not a coincidence, since one can easily derive a digital signature scheme from any SSTC scheme, as the next theorem demonstrates. Intuitively, to sign a message m, one exhibits the ability to open a commitment with label m to both the message 0 and the message 1.
More precisely, let SIG TC = (sig gen TC ; sig sign TC ; sig verify TC ) be speci ed as follows.
sig gen TC (1 k ) computes (pk; sk) TCgen(1 k ), sets sig vk = pk, sig sk = (pk; sk), and outputs (sig vk; sig sk). Proof: Say a forger F, given public key sig vk = pk and a signature oracle, is able to forge a signature in SIG TC . Then we give an adversary A that breaks the simulation-sound binding property of the TC as follows. A takes a TC public key pk and an oracle S, gives F sig vk = pk as the public key of SIG TC and plays the part of the signature oracle by running the sig sign procedure, but using S to generate commitments and decommitments. Since 
Application to ZK proofs
We show how an SSTC scheme can be used to construct unbounded simulation-sound ZK protocols, unbounded non-malleable ZK protocols, and universally composable ZK protocols. Our constructions are conceptually simpler than those given by Garay et al. 31 ].
All our results will be in the common reference string (CRS) model, which assumes that there is a string uniformly generated from some distribution and is available to all parties at the start of a protocol. Note that this is a generalization of the public random string model, where a uniform distribution over xed-length bit strings is assumed.
Unbounded Simulation Sound ZK
Intuitively, a ZK protocol is unbounded simulation sound if an adversary cannot convince the veri er of a false statement with non-negligible probability, even after interacting with an arbitrary number of (simulated) provers. We use the formal de nition from 31], and present this de nition in Appendix A for completeness.
Our construction starts with a class of three-round, public-coin, honest-veri er zero-knowledge protocols, also known as -protocols 13]. We brie y describe -protocols here and defer the formal de nitions to Appendix B.
Consider a binary relation R(x; w) that is computable in polynomial time. A -protocol for the relation R proves membership of x in the language L R = fx j 9 w; s:t: R(x; w) = 1g. For a given x, let (a; c; z) denote the conversation between the prover and the veri er. To compute the rst and the nal messages, the prover invokes e cient algorithms a (x; w; r) and z (x; w; r; c), respectively, where w is the witness, r is the random bits, and c is the challenge from the veri er (as the second message).
Using an e cient predicate (x; a; c; z), the veri er decides whether the conversation is accepting with respect to x. The relation R, and the algorithms a( ), z( ) and ( ), are public.
We assume the protocol has a simulator S that, taking the challenge as input, generates an accepting conversation. More precisely, we have (a; c; z) S (c), such that the distribution of (a; c; z) is computationally indistinguishable from the real conversation.
The protocol USS R pk] (x) is shown in Figure 1 , and uses an SSTC scheme TC. Say is a -protocol for relation R. The prover generates a pair (sig vk; sig sk) for a strong one-time signature scheme and sends sig vk to the veri er. Then the prover generates the rst message a of and sends its commitment com a to the veri er, using the signature veri cation key sig vk as the commitment tag.
After receiving the challenge c, the prover generates and sends the third message z of , opens the commitment com a , signs the entire transcript using the signing key sig sk, and sends the signature on the transcript to the veri er. (To be speci c, the transcript consists of all values sent or received by the prover in the protocol, except the nal signature.) prover veri er (sig vk; sig sk) sig gen 1 (1 k ) a a (x; w; r) (com a ; dec a ) TCcom(pk; a; sig vk) sig vk; com ac z z (x; w; r; c) s sig sign 1 (sig sk; transcript) a; dec a ; z; s -TCver(pk; com a ; a; sig vk; dec a ) (x; a; c; z) sig verify 1 (sig vk; transcript)
An unbounded simulation-sound ZK protocol for relationship R with common input x and common reference string pk, where pk is drawn from the distribution TCgen(1 k ). The prover also knows the witness w such that R(x; w) = 1. Now we describe the simulator S = (S 1 ; S 2 ) for protocol USS R pk] (x). S 1 (1 k ) generates a key pair of the SSTC scheme by invoking (pk; sk) TCgen(1 k ), and then outputs (pk; sk). The behavior of S 2 (sk) is more involved. On input x, it rst checks if x 2L R and aborts if not. Then, it generates a strong one-time signature key pair (sig vk; sig sk) as the prover. Next, S 2 (sk) fakes a commitment by generating ( g com; ) TCfakeCom(pk; sk; sig vk) and sends g com to the veri er. On receiving the challenge c, it uses the simulator of protocol to compute an accepting conversation: (a; c; z) S (c). Next, S 2 generates a decommitment to a by setting f dec TCfakeDecom( ; g com; sig vk; a) and signs the transcript using the strong one-time signature scheme; let s be the signature. Finally S 2 sends over (a; f dec; z; s) as the third message.
Theorem 4.1 The protocol USS R pk] (x) is a USSZK argument.
The proof is postponed to Appendix D.
Unbounded Non-malleable ZK
Intuitively, a ZK protocol is unbounded non-malleable if an e cient witness extractor successfully extracts a witness from any adversary that causes the veri er to accept, even when the adversary is also allowed to interact with any number of (simulated) provers. We use the formal de nition from 31] and present this de nition in Appendix A for completeness. Our construction of the NMZK protocol is very similar to that of the USSZK protocol presented above, where the only di erence is that the -protocol is replaced by an -protocol. Recall that an -protocol 31] is like a -protocol with the additional property that it admits a polynomial-time, straight-line extractor (an -protocol works in the CRS model). A bit more formally, there exists a pair of polynomial-time algorithms (E 1 ; E 2 ) with the following properties. E 1 generates a pair ( ; ): ( ; ) E 1 , where is a \simulated CRS" that is computationally indistinguishable from the real distribution and is the \backdoor information". E 2 will produce a \potential-witness"w from the backdoor information and an accepting conversation (a; c; z):w E 2 (x; ; (a; c; z)). Furthermore, we have the property that the potential-witnessw is indeed a witness if there exists another accepting conversation (a; c 0 ; z 0 ) with the same rst-message, but di erent challenges. We include the formal de nitions in Appendix B.
The protocol NM R pk; ] (x) is shown in Figure 3 . It is very similar to the protocol in Figure 2 , but note that here we assume that is an -protocol with being the CRS. erates a decommitment to a by setting f dec TCfakeDecom( ; g com; sig vk; a) and signs the transcript using the strong one-time signature scheme; let s be the signature. Finally S 2 sends over (a; f dec; z; s)
as the third message.
The extractor E = (E 1 ; E 2 ) for protocol NM R pk; ] (x) is straightforward. E 1 (1 k ) generates a key pair of the SSTC scheme by invoking (pk; sk) TCgen(1 k ), and then generates ( ; ) E ;1 (1 k ). Next, E 1 (1 k ) outputs ((pk; ); sk; ). E 2 ( ) simply runs as the veri er V until V outputs a bit b. If b = 1, then E 2 ( ) takes the conversation (a; c; z) of protocol and invokes the extractor for protocol : w E ;2 (x; ; (a; c; z)); if b = 0, then E 2 ( ) sets w ?. Finally E 2 ( ) outputs (b; w). Theorem 4.2 The protocol NM R pk; ] (x) is an NMZK argument of knowledge for the relation R.
The proof to this theorem is very similar to that to Theorem 4.1 and is postponed to Appendix D.
Universally Composable ZK
The universal composability paradigm was proposed by Canetti 6] for de ning the security and composition of protocols. To de ne security one rst speci es an ideal functionality using a trusted party that describes the desired behavior of the protocol. Then one proves that a particular protocol operating in a real-life model securely realizes this ideal functionality, as de ned below. Here we brie y summarize the framework as de ned in Canetti and Krawczyk 8].
A (real-life) protocol is de ned as a set of n interactive Turing Machines P 1 ; : : : ; P n , designating the n parties in the protocol. It operates in the presence of an environment Z and an adversary A, both of which are also modeled as interactive Turing Machines. The environment Z provides inputs and receives outputs from honest parties, and may communicate with A. A controls (and may view) all communication between the parties. (Note that this models asynchronous communication on open point-to-point channels.) We will assume that messages are authenticated, and thus A may not insert or modify messages between honest parties. 9 A also may corrupt parties, in which case it obtains the internal state of the party. (In the non-erasing model, the internal state would encompass the complete internal history of the party.)
The ideal process with respect to a functionality F, is de ned for n parties P 1 ; : : : ; P n , an environment Z, and an (ideal-process) adversary S. However, P 1 ; : : : ; P n are now dummy parties that simply forward (over secure channels) inputs received from Z to F, and forward (again over secure channels) outputs received from F to Z. Thus the ideal process is a trivially secure protocol with the input-output behavior of F.
More details are given in Appendix C.
The zero-knowledge functionality. The (multi-session) ZK functionality as de ned by Canetti 6] is given in Figure 4 . In the functionality, parameterized by a relation R, the prover sends to the functionality the input x together with a witness w. If R(x; w) holds, then the functionality forwards x to the veri er. As pointed out in 6], this is actually a proof of knowledge in that the veri er is assured that the prover actually knows w.
F R ZK proceeds as follows, running parties P 1 ; : : : ; P n , and an adversary S:
Upon receiving (zk-prover; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x; w) from P i : If R(x; w) then send (ZK-PROOF; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x) to P j and S. Otherwise, ignore. x and aux in the rst message. We denote the slightly modi ed protocol where the aux eld is set to (sid; ssid; P i ; P j ) by ANM R pk; ] (x). Then it follows that ANM R pk; ] (x) is a UCZK protocol for relation R, assuming static corruptions.
However, one can simplify this protocol by removing the one-time signature scheme, only including the identities of the prover and veri er in the auxiliary string, and using this auxiliary string as the tag of the commitment scheme. This simpli ed scheme, MYZK R pk; ] (x), is shown in Figure 5 . (Note that since we are assuming authenticated communication in the UC framework, the identities P i and P j will be known to both parties, and thus do not need to be explicitly sent in our protocol.) Furthermore, this protocol can be easily modi ed into one that remains secure against adaptive corruption in the erasing model. In fact, all that is needed is to have the prover erase the randomness used in the -protocol before sending the nal message. 9 This feature could be added to an unauthenticated model using a message authentication functionality as described in 6]. P i (prover) P j (veri er) a a (x; w; r; ) (com a ; dec a ) TCcom(pk; a; hP i ; P j i)
x; com ac z z (x; w; r; c; ) a; dec a ; z -TCver(pk; com a ; a; hP i ; P j i; dec a ) (x; a; c; z) The proof is postponed to Appendix D.
Comparison to Non-Malleable Commitments
We explore the exact relation between SSTC schemes and NMC schemes.
De nitions of NM commitments
Our de nition for non-malleable (NM) commitments is based on the de nition in 21], which, technically speaking, de nes the notion of -non-malleability, instead of strict non-malleability. For the clarity of presentation, we shall use the term \non-malleability" to mean -non-malleability, and will note any places where our results have application to strict non-malleability.
Informally, similar to the de nition in 21], we say a commitment scheme is non-malleable if when an adversary sees a commitment com 1 , generates its own commitment com 2 , and sees com 1 opened, it cannot then open com 2 to a value related to com 1 with any greater probability than a simulator that never saw com 1 in the rst place. Note that this is also called non-malleability with respect to opening 20] and di ers from the original de nition of 22] that was discussed in the introduction, and which is also called non-malleability with respect to commitment. Our de nition di ers from the de nition in 21] as follows.
We only de ne NM trapdoor commitment (NMTC) schemes, since that is what will be of most interest in comparisons to SSTC schemes. Non-trapdoor versions of these de nitions are straightforward. We use tag-based de nitions instead of body-based de nitions. Again this is what will be of most interest in comparisons to SSTC schemes. Body-based de nitions are straightforward. In fact, most of our results relating SSTC schemes and NMTC schemes also hold when these schemes are de ned using body-based de nitions. We will discuss this later. As mentioned in the introduction, the recent work of Damg ard and Groth 17] generalizes and strengthens the de nition of non-malleable commitments to be reusable, i.e., to have the property that seeing one or more commitments does not give another party any advantage in generating one or more commitments that can later be opened to values related to the values in the original commitments.
Their de nition also stipulates that the distribution of committed messages is dependent on the public key. However, we will continue to use the simpler de nition, since it exempli es the relation between SSTC schemes and NMTC schemes. Later we will discuss how to obtain similar relations to reusable NMTC schemes.
In the following we assume tags are strings of length polynomial in the security parameter k. We generalize the de nition above and consider NMTC(`) schemes, which are NMTC schemes in which A 1 and A 2 are allowed to query an oracle O pk;sk as de ned in the SSTC de nition, but with at most`commit queries allowed. (Note that there is just one oracle that both A 1 and A 2 call, and thus at most a total of`commit queries between them.) Also the condition in the de nition of A;tag 1 ;D;R (k) is restricted to tag 2 6 2 Q, where Q is the list of tags used in commit queries to O pk;sk . Note that an NMTC scheme is an NMTC(0) scheme. We use`= 1 to denote an oracle which accepts an unbounded number of commit queries.
We similarly generalize the de nition of SSTC schemes and consider SSTC(`) schemes. Then an SSTC(0) scheme is just a TC scheme, and an SSTC (1) scheme is what we have called an SSTC scheme.
Notice that we have de ned NMTC schemes as tag-based, as opposed to body-based, as usually seen in literature 22, 20, 29, 21, 17] . As we have explained in the introduction, this is because we de ned our SSTC schemes to be tag-based as well. However, this is not a signi cant distinction since there exists fairly generic reductions from one to the other. Our next theorem shows such a reduction from body-based NMTC schemes to tag-based ones.
Here, we assume the commitment scheme allows commitments to strings of arbitrary length. A similar theorem could be shown for commitment schemes which allow only xed length commitments, say of length equal to the security parameter. 10 In other words, may be a function of k such that ?1 is bounded by a polynomial in k. Theorem 5.3 Let TC be a body-based NMTC scheme. Let TC 0 be TC, but with the tag added to the message being committed. That is, TCgen 0 (1 k ) returns the result of TCgen(1 k ), TCcom 0 (pk; v; tag) returns the result of TCcom(pk; hv; tagi; tag), and TCver 0 (pk; com; v; tag; dec) returns the result of TCver(pk; com; hv; tagi; tag; dec Note that Theorem 5.3 could be generalized to apply to non-trapdoor commitment schemes and to strict non-malleable commitment schemes (as opposed to -non-malleable commitment schemes). However, we do not know any easy way (e.g., without adding a more complicated construction, like a zero-knowledge proof) to convert a body-based NMTC(`) scheme into a tag-based NMTC(`) scheme, for any`> 0. The problem is dealing with the oracles, and the fact that one restricts success using a tag-based de nition, and the other restricts success using a body-based de nition. Now considering the problem of converting tag-based SSTC or NMTC schemes to body-based SSTC or NMTC schemes, it seems that a simple construction like the one in Theorem 5.3 does not su ce.
Instead
-based commitment, signing the tag-based commitment using the signing key, and giving the pair (the tag-based commitment and the associated signature) as the full commitment. As this is a fairly standard technique, used in, e.g. 31], we omit the analysis here.
Relations between SSTC and NMTC
First we show that for all` 0, an SSTC(`+ 1) scheme is also an NMTC(`) scheme. We use the notation A( ; !) to denote a probabilistic algorithm A that has its random bits xed to !. (Note that all probabilistic subroutines called by A will also have their random bits xed.) Theorem 5.4 Let TC be an SSTC(`+ 1) scheme. Then TC is an NMTC(`) scheme. Proof: This proof has the same structure as, but is a generalization of, the proof of Theorem 1 in 21]. 11 Take any polynomial r( ), any PPT A = (A 1 ; A 2 ) for the unbounded non-malleability of TC. Construct a simulator S that depends on a parameter and runs as follows, with O pk;sk queries answered by S (which it can do since it will know sk). Their proof shows that a speci c trapdoor commitment scheme with a slightly stronger binding property (similar to a body-based SSTC (1) but not quite as strong) is also an body-based NMTC scheme. 12 Note that in Expt, ! is preceded by a comma and not a semicolon. Therefore it is a parameter to Expt, and is not the random bits of the tape for running Expt. ! will be used to x the random bits for a subroutine of Expt. To bound the rst probability, recall that in the experiment for choosing m 2 , we are given up to 2 ?1 ln 2 ?1 tries to obtain m 2 6 = ?, and in each attempt, the probability is at least =2 assuming that Using this we will show how to construct a PPT adversary B that contradicts the fact that TC is an SSTC(`+ 1) scheme. For (pk; sk) TCgen To analyze the success probability, note that if the condition de ning A;tag 1 ;D;R (k) is satis ed, then B succeeds, since neither m 2 nor m 0 2 is ?, they are di erent, and the commitment com 2 has been opened to each one. So B succeeds with probability at least A;tag 1 ;D;R (k). This contradicts the fact that TC is an SSTC(`+ 1) scheme. Thus TC is an NMTC(`) commitment scheme.
To relate our results to reusable non-malleable commitment schemes as de ned in 17], we need to consider adversaries that input a vector of commitments (and later decommitments), and output a vector of commitments (and later decommitments). To be speci c, let (t; u)-NMTC(`) denote a reusable NMTC commitment scheme with an input vector of size t and an output vector of size u.
Then using a proof similar to above, but with some additional ideas from 17], we can prove the following theorem. 13 13 As in 17], we change the de nition of a valid relation (over vectors of messages) to one in which all messages including ? are allowed, but where the probability of the relation being true cannot be increased by changing a message in the second (adversarially-chosen) vector to ?. Theorem 5.5 Let TC be an SSTC(`+ t) scheme. Then TC is a (t; u)-NMTC(`) scheme. Now we look at the opposite direction. Theorem 5.6 Let TC be an NMTC(`) scheme. Then TC is an SSTC(`) scheme. Proof: First note that if there is at most one possible tag, then the TC must be an SSTC(`) scheme by the binding property of TC. So assume there are more than one possible tags. Say a scheme TC is not an SSTC(`) scheme. Then there exists a polynomial ( ) and a PPT adversary B that, when given a public key generated by TCgen(1 k ) and with access to an oracle to which it can make at most`commit queries, for in nitely many k's, produces with probability more than (k) a tuple (com; tag; v 1 ; v 2 ; dec 1 ; dec 2 ) such that tag was not queried to commit, v 1 where w 2 = C(1 k ; v 2 ). In other words, R is the inner product of the rst p 0 (k) bits of v 1 with the p 0 (k)-length encoding of v 2 , exclusive-or the (p 0 (k) + 1)st bit of v 1 . 14 Let tag 1 be an identi er that is output by B at most half the time B succeeds. This identi er must exist since there are at least 14 Note that one can also construct relations with the two desired properties if the commitment scheme xes the bit length of a message, e.g., to 1 (a single bit) or k. two possible identi ers. Then using the properties of R, and using the fact that the probability that tag 2 = tag 1 is at most 1 2 when B succeeds, it is easy to see that for in nitely many k's, Proof: We shall prove the theorem constructively. For every` 0, we construct a scheme DL`that is SSTC(`) (assuming the hardness of discrete logarithm) but not NMTC(`). Our construction is a modi ed version of the non-malleable commitment scheme based on discrete logarithms by Di Crescenzo et.al . 21] . Before describing the construction in more detail, we discuss some intuition behind the construction.
Given security parameter k, let G q denote a nite (cyclic) group of order q, where q is prime and jqj = k. Let g be a generator of G q , and assume it is included in the description of G q . We will assume that elements in G q can be e ciently sampled uniformly at random, and that for a random y 2 G q , it is computationally infeasible to compute x such that y = g x . This value x is the discrete log of y, and this assumption is called the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption. (For instance, G q may be a multiplicative subgroup of Z p , for some large prime p where qj(p ? 1).)
Notice that the group G is isomorphic to the additive group Z q in a straightforward manner (in fact Z q is a eld, a fact we shall use later). Now let us turn our attention to polynomials over Z q . We write a degree-`polynomial as P(x) = a 0 + a 1 x + a` x`. We state two extremely useful facts that shall be employed in our construction. These facts are used as well in secret sharing and threshold cryptography 49].
(`+ 1)-wise independence
A random degree-`polynomial is (`+ 1)-wise independent. In other words, for a degree-p olynomial P(x), the knowledge of its value on`positions does not yield any information of its value on a new position. More precisely, by a random polynomial, we mean one whose coe cients are chosen from Z q uniformly at random. Then, for any x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x`+ 1 2 Z q , such that the x i 's are all distinct for i = 1; 2; :::;`+ 1, and any y 1 ; y 2 ; :::; y`2 Z q , P(x`+ 1 ) is still uniformly random over Z q , for a random polynomial P( ) conditioned on P(x i ) = y i , for i = 1; 2:::;`.
(`+ 2)-wise dependence
A degree-`polynomial is (`+ 2)-wise dependent. For any distinct x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x`+ 2 2 Z q , there exist constants 1 ; 2 ; ::; `+1 2 Z q such that for any degree-`polynomial P(x), 1 P(x 1 ) + Very roughly speaking, we shall use the rst fact to show that our construction is SSTC(`), and the second fact to show that it is not NMTC(`). We explain it in more detail next.
The DL l scheme is a modi ed version of the commitment scheme by Di Crescenzo et. pk also consists of the description of G q (which we will henceforth denote simply as G q ), and (`+ 1) random elements in G q , denoted by g 0 ; g 1 ; ::::; g`. The corresponding secret key consists of the discrete logarithms of the g i 's base g. In other words, sk = (a 0 ; a 1 ; :::; a`) such that g a i = g i , for i = 0; 1; :::;`.
To commit to a message m 2 Z q with tag, a sender rst generates a fresh veri cation/signing key pair for a strong one-time signature scheme using (sig vk; sig sk) sig gen(1 k ) and then computes H(sig vk). We call the \seed" of the commitment. Notice that since H( ) is a universal one-way hash function, is in some sense \fresh." Next, the sender picks a random r 2 Z q and computes
We call B the \body" of the commitment. Finally the sender generates a signature s on tag using sig sk 1 , and sends over com = (sig vk; tag; B; s) as the commitment. To decommit, the sender simply exhibits (m; r), and then the receiver veri es that Eq.(2) holds and the signature is valid.
The protocol is described in Figure 6 . Notice that the DKOS protocol 21] can be regarded as a variation (where a message authentication code replaces the strong one-time signature scheme) of the special case of DL`with`= 1. = sig verify(vk; tag; s) Figure 6 : The DL`commitment scheme. The public key is pk = (H; p; q; g; g 0 ; :::g`).
To see that this is a trapdoor commitment scheme, we show how to produce commitments that can be equivocated with the secret key (i.e., we construct TCfakeCom and TCfakeDecom). Using the secret key sk, we de ne a polynomial P(x) = a 0 + a 1 x + + a` x`. Notice that if g i 's are randomly chosen, then a i 's are random elements in Z q , and thus P(x) is a random degree-`polynomial. Now, Eq.(2) can be simpli ed to B = g P( ) m+r . Notice that the polynomial P(x) is explicitly expressed in the secret key sk, but only implicit given by the public key pk. Notice that with knowledge of P( ), where is the seed of a commitment, one may equivocate that commitment. More precisely, say one wishes to produce a commitment with tag that can be equivocated on decommitment. One generates a signature key pair (sig vk; sig sk), computes the seed = H(sig vk), picks a random t 2 Z q , produces B = g t as the body of the commitment, and sets the commitment to (sig vk; tag; B; s), where s is the signature on tag using sig sk. Note that using sk, one can e ciently compute P( ). Thus to open this commitment to a message m, one simply computes r = t ? P( ) m and sends (m; r) as the decommitment. This shows that DL`is a trapdoor commitment scheme.
Next, we show that the DL`scheme has the simulation-sound binding property.
First consider a commitment com = (sig vk; B; s) with seed = H(sig vk). Suppose it is opened in two di erent ways: dec 0 = (m 0 ; r 0 ) and dec 1 = (m 1 ; r 1 ). Then g P( ) m 0 +r 0 = B = g P( ) m 1 +r 1 , so P( ) = (r 1 ? r 0 )=(m 0 ? m 1 ). In other words, given two openings to the same commitment, com, one can easily extract P( ) for the seed . Now we can see the intuitive reason why DL`is secure. Imagine an adversary A that interacts with an equivocation oracle (i.e., the oracle given in the description of the simulation-sound binding property) to obtain arbitrary decommitments for`commitments. Intuitively, A obtains the values of P(x) on`di erent seeds (we denote them by 1 ; 2 ; :::; `) . If we can force A to use a new seed in the commitment it wishes to equivocate (which is achieved by means of the universal one-way hash function H and the strong one-time signature scheme SIG), then one can easily extract P( ). However, since the values P( 1 ); :::; P( `) do not carry any information about P( ) (by the (`+ 1)-wise independence property), this value should have been computationally infeasible to produce, by the security of the Pedersen commitment scheme (which is based on the DL assumption).
More precisely, say an adversary A breaks the simulation-sound binding property of DL`. Then we will construct a \breaker" B that breaks the DL assumption. B takes as input G q and an element h 2 G q chosen uniformly at random, and will output log g h with a probability that negligibly close to the probability that A breaks the simulation-sound binding property. We use the variable X to denote log g h (which is a priori unknown to B). B runs a copy of A and interacts with A as the equivocation oracle. B works in three phases. (1), such that P( 0 ) = u P( ) + v, and hence compute P( 0 ). But X = 0 = P( 0 ), and X is the discrete log of h base g. Therefore B is able to compute the discrete log of h.
Finally, we show that DL`is not NMTC(`), due to the (`+ 2)-wise dependence of degree-`polynomials. We shall present an adversary A that asks the equivocation oracle for multiple openings to`commitments, receives a commitment com and then produces a commitment com 0 , such that it can always open com 0 to whatever message com is opened to. Clearly, such an adversary completely breaks non-malleability (speci cally, for the equality relation).
We now describe the adversary A. Recall that associated with the public key is a \hidden" random polynomial P(x). First, A obtains the value of P(x) on`di erent inputs by means of the equivocation oracle, and then receives a commitment com = (sig vk; tag; B; s). Let Proof: The idea behind this proof is that we can modify any NMTC(`) scheme and have it \leak" some information about the secret key when answering oracle queries (from the de nition of simulationsound binding) to equivocate a commitment. We control the leak in such a way that`commit queries do not yield any information, but`+ 1 commit queries will leak the secret key. This will imply that the modi ed scheme is still NMTC(`), but not SSTC(`+ 1).
More precisely, consider an arbitrary NMTC(`) scheme TC = (TCgen; TCcom; TCver; TCfakeCom; TCfakeDecom). Without the loss of generality, we may assume that the secret key sk produced by TCgen(1 k ) is an element in Z q for some prime number q (we can alway encode sk as a eld element in a eld large enough), and furthermore that q is at least k bits long. Now we modify TC slightly to produce a new commitment scheme TC 0 = (TCgen 0 ; TCcom 0 ; TCver 0 ; TCfakeCom 0 ; TCfakeDecom 0 ). In TC 0 , the decommitment dec 0 contains an additional pair of elements (x; y) 2 Z q Z q which we call the \leaking channel". The commitment function TCcom 0 lls the leaking channel with a random element pair in Z q , and the veri cation function TCver 0 ignores it. Thus the \basic" commitment/decommitment functionality remains unchanged with the addition of the leaking channel. In fact, the leaking channel is only used by the functions TCfakeCom 0 and TCfakeDecom 0 to \leak" the information about the secret key sk, as we explain next.
In TC 0 , the public key pk 0 is the same as pk. The secret key sk 0 consists of the secret key sk of the original scheme TC and a random degree-`polynomial P(x) = a 0 +a 1 x+ +a` x`over Z q satisfying that P(0) = sk (or equivalently, a 0 = sk). Here, a random polynomial over Z q is a polynomial whose coe cients are chosen uniformly at random from Z q .
The leaking channel is used by the faking functions to leak the values of P(x) on random elements of Z q . More precisely, the new commitment-faking function TCfakeCom 0 (pk; sk; tag) rst invokes TCfakeCom by setting (c; ) TCfakeCom(pk; sk; tag), and then picks a random x 2 Z q , sets 0 = ( ; x; P(x)) and outputs (c; 0 ). The new decommitment-faking function TCfakeDecom 0 ( 0 ; c; tag; v), where 0 = ( ; x; P(x)), outputs (TCfakeDecom( ; c; tag; v); x; P(x)). Notice that TCfakeDecom 0 lls the leaking channel with the information of P(x) over a particular input x.
We now prove that the new scheme TC 0 remains NMTC(`). First, the standard hiding/binding property of TC 0 follows straightforwardly from that of TC. Next, the trapdoor property of TC 0 remains essentially unchanged from that of TC. This is because (x; P(x)) is uniformly distributed over Z q Z q for random x 2 Z q and random P( ), except when x = 0, which happens with probability 1 q , and therefore the leaking channel in TCcom 0 is statistically indistinguishable from the leaking channel in TCfakeCom 0 =TCfakeDecom 0 .
Finally, the non-malleability of TC 0 follows almost straightforwardly from that of TC. Notice that an adversary making up to`commit queries learns at most`pairs (x i ; P(x i )) from the leaking channel.
Since each x i is uniformly chosen at random, the probability that x i = 0 for some i, or that x i = x j for some i and j, is at most`+`2 q , which is negligible. Now we may suppose the x i 's are all nonzero and distinct. Since P(x) is a random degree-`polynomial, P(x 1 ), P(x 2 ),..., P(x`) are all independent uniformly random elements in Z q and therefore they don't carry any information about sk = P(0).
Thus for any adversary A 0 that breaks TC 0 , we can easily construct an A that breaks TC. Essentially A runs a copy of A 0 , and simulates the faking oracle for TC 0 by lling the leaking channel with a random element pair (x i ; y i ) 2 Z q Z q in the reply to the decommitment of the ith commitment A requests.
However, the TC 0 scheme is obviously not SSTC(`+ 1), since with`+ 1 queries, an adversary can determine P(0) by Lagrange interpolation (except when there is a collision, i.e., x i = x j for some i and j in the leaking channel, which happens with negligible probability as discussed above). Thus the adversary completely breaks the scheme. We mention that Theorems 5. For some de nitions below, we need to de ne security when an adversary is allowed to interact with more than one instance of a machine. Therefore it will be convenient to de ne a common wrapper machine that handles this \multi-session" type of interaction. 16 For an interactive machine A, we de ne A to be a protocol wrapper for A, that takes two types of inputs on its communication tape: (start; ; x; w): For this message A starts a new interactive machine A with label , common input x, private input w, a freshly generated random input r, and using the CRS of A . (msg; ; m): For this message A sends the message m to the interactive machine with label (if it exists), and returns the output message of that machine.
We de ne the output of A to be a tuple (x; tr; v), where x is the common input (from the start message), tr is the transcript (the input and output messages A) and v is the output of A. (In particular, if A is a veri er in a zero-knowledge protocol, this output will be 1 for accept, and 0 for reject.) We say A 1 is the wrapper of A that ignores all the subsequent start messages after seeing the rst one. E ectively, A 1 is a \single-session" version of A. We say two interactive machines B and C are coordinated if they have a single control, but two distinct sets of input/output communication tapes. For four interactive machines A, B, C, and D we de ne (hA; Bi; hC; Di) ] as the local output of D after an interactive execution with C and after an interactive execution of A and B, all using CRS . Note that we will only be concerned with this if B and C are coordinated.
We note that all our ZK de nitions use black-box, non-rewinding simulators, and our proofs of knowledge use non-rewinding extractors. 16 This is similar to the \multi-session extension" concept in Canetti and Rabin 10].
De nition A.1 Unbounded ZK Proof] = (D; P; V; S = (S 1 ; S 2 )) is an unbounded ZK proof (resp., argument) system for an NP language L with witness relation R if D is an ensemble of polynomial-time samplable distributions, P, V, and S 2 are probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machines, and S 1 is a probabilistic polynomial-time machine, such that there exist negligible functions and (the simulation error), such that for all k, Completeness For all x 2 L of length k, all w such that R(x; w) = 1, and all 2 D k the probability that hP(w); Vi ] (x) = 0 is less than (k). Soundness For all unbounded (resp., polynomial-time) adversaries A, if R D k , then for all x 6 2 L, the probability that hA; Vi ] (x) = 1 is less than (k). Unbounded ZK For all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machines A, we have that j Pr Expt A (k) = 1] ?Pr Expt S A (k) = 1]j (k), where the experiments Expt A (k) and Expt S A (k)
are de ned as follows:
where S 0 ( ) runs as follows on common reference string , common input x and private input w: if R(x; w) = 1, S 0 ( ) runs S 2 ( ) on common reference string and common input x; otherwise S 0 ( ) runs S null , where S null is an interactive machine that simply aborts. 17 We point out that this de nition only requires the simulator to simulate a valid proof, which is implemented by having S 0 have access to the witness w and only invoking S 2 when w is valid. 18 However, S 2 does not access the witness and will simulate a proof from the input x only. De nition A.2 Same-String Unbounded ZK] = (D; P; V; S = (S 1 ; S 2 )) is a same-string unbounded ZK argument system for an NP language L with witness relation R if is an unbounded ZK argument system for L with the additional property that the distribution of the reference string output by S 1 (1 k ) is exactly D k .
We only de ne same-string unbounded ZK arguments since, as shown in 19], any protocol that is same-string unbounded ZK must be an argument, and not a proof.
The following de nes unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge (USSZK). This has been useful in applications. In particular, as shown in 47], the one-time version su ces for the security of a (noninteractive) ZK protocol in the construction of adaptive chosen-ciphertext secure cryptosystems using the Naor-Yung 42] paradigm. We directly de ne the unbounded version, needed in other applications such as threshold password-authenticated key exchange 39].
De nition A.3 Unbounded Simulation-Sound ZK]
= (D; P; V; S = (S 1 ; S 2 )) is an unbounded simulation-sound ZK proof (resp., argument) system for an NP language L if is an unbounded ZK proof (resp., argument) system for L and furthermore, there exists a negligible function such that for all k, where S 00 ( ) runs as follows on CRS , common input x and private input w: S 00 ( ) runs S 2 ( ) on CRS and common input x.
In the above de nition, we emphasize that S 2 may be asked to simulate false proofs for x 6 2 L R , since S 00 does not check whether (x; w) 2 R. The idea is that even if the adversary is able to obtain acceptable proofs on false statements, it will not be able to produce any new acceptable proof on a false statement.
The following de nes non-malleable zero-knowledge (NMZK) proofs (resp., arguments) of knowledge. If a protocol is NMZK according to our de nition, then this implies the protocol is also a NMZK in the explicit witness sense (as de ned in 19]). Moreover, we show that the protocol is also UCZK in the model of static corruptions. Also note that simulation soundness is implied by this de nition.
De nition A.4 Non-malleable ZK Proof/Argument of Knowledge] = (D; P; V; S = (S 1 ; S 2 ); E = (E 1 ; E 2 )) is a non-malleable ZK proof (resp., argument) of knowledge system for an NP language L with witness relation R if is an unbounded ZK proof (resp., argument) system for L and furthermore, E 1 and E 2 are probabilistic polynomial-time machines such that there exists a negligible function (the knowledge error) such that for all k, Reference String Indistinguishability The distribution of the rst output of S 1 (1 k ) is identical to the distribution of the rst output of E 1 (1 k ). Extractor Indistinguishability For any 2 f0; 1g , the distribution of the output of V 1 is identical to the distribution of the restricted output of E 2 ( ) 1 Let Q be the set of transcripts Let Q be the set of transcripts of machines in S 00 ( ) . of machines in S 00 ( 1 ) .
Return 1 i b = 1 and
Return 1 i b = 1, (x; w) 2 R, and for all tr 0 2 Q, tr 6 ./ tr 0 for all tr 0 2 Q, tr 6 ./ tr 0 where S 00 ( ) runs as follows on CRS , common input x and private input w: S 00 ( ) runs S 2 ( ) on CRS and common input x.
In the above de nition, as in the de nition of USSZK protocols, we emphasize that S 2 may be asked to simulate false proofs for x 6 2 L R , since S 00 does not check whether (x; w) 2 R. The idea is that even if the adversary is able to obtain acceptable proofs on false statements, it will not be able to produce any new acceptable proof for which a witness cannot be extracted.
B -protocols and -protocols
Here we overview the basic de nitions and properties of -protocols 13]
First we start with some de nitions and notation. Let R = f(x; w)g be a binary relation and assume that for some given polynomial p( ) it holds that jwj p(jxj) for all (x; w) 2 R. Furthermore, let R be testable in polynomial time. Let L R = fx : (x; w) 2 Rg be the language de ned by the relation, and for all x 2 L R , let W R (x) = fw : (x; w) 2 Rg be the witness set for x. For any NP language L, note that there is a natural witness relation R containing pairs (x; w) where w is the witness for the membership of x in L, and that L R = L. Now we de ne a -protocol (A; B) to be a three move interactive protocol between a probabilistic polynomial-time prover A and a probabilistic polynomial-time veri er B, where the prover acts rst.
The veri er is only required to send random bits as a challenge to the prover. For some (x; w) 2 R, the common input to both players is x while w is private input to the prover. For such given x, let (a; c; z) denote the conversation between the prover and the veri er. To compute the rst and nal messages, the prover invokes e cient algorithms a( ) and z( ), respectively, using (x; w) and random bits as input. Using an e cient predicate ( ), the veri er decides whether the conversation is accepting with respect to x. The relation R, the algorithms a( ), z( ) and ( ) are public. The length of the challenges is denoted t B , and we assume that t B only depends on the length of the common string x.
We will need to broaden this de nition slightly, to deal with cheating provers. We will de neL R to be the input language, with the property that L R L R , and membership inL R may be tested in polynomial time. We implicitly assume B only executes the protocol if the common input x 2L R .
All -protocols presented here will satisfy the following security properties:
Weak special soundness: Let (a; c; z) and (a; c 0 ; z 0 ) be two conversations, that are accepting for some given x 2L R . If c 6 = c 0 , then x 2 L R . The pair of accepting conversations (a; c; z) and (a; c 0 ; z 0 ) with c 6 = c 0 is called a collision.
Special honest veri er zero knowledge (SHVZK): There is a (probabilistic polynomial time) simulator M that on input x 2 L R generates accepting conversations with a distribution that is indistinguishable 19 from when A and B execute the protocol on common input x (and A is given a witness w for x), and B indeed honestly chooses its challenges uniformly at random. The simulator is special in the sense that it can additionally take a random string c as input, and output an accepting conversation for x where c is the challenge. In fact, we will assume the simulator has this special property for not only x 2 L R , but also any x 2L R .
Speci cally, there is a negligible function (k) such that for all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial- Some of the -protocols also satisfy the following property.
Special soundness: Let (a; c; z) and (a; c 0 ; z 0 ) be two conversations, that are accepting for some given x, with c 6 = c 0 . Then given x and those two conversations, a witness w such that (x; w) 2 R can be computed e ciently. 19 Often this is required to be perfectly indistinguishable, but we generalize the de nition slightly to only require computational indistinguishability.
A simple but important fact (see 13] ) is that if a -protocol is HVZK, the protocol is witness indistinguishable (WI) 25]. Although HVZK by itself is de ned with respect to a very much restricted veri er, i.e. an honest one, this means that if for a given instance x there are at least two witnesses w, then even a malicious veri er cannot distinguish which witness the prover uses.
B.1 -protocols
An -protocol (A; B) ] for a relation R = f(x; w)g and CRS , is a -protocol for relation R with the following additional properties.
1. For a given distribution ensemble D, a common reference string is drawn from D k and each function a( ), z( ), and ( ) takes as an additional input. (Naturally, the simulator M in the de nition of -protocols may also take as an additional input.)
2. There exists a polynomial-time extractor E = (E 1 ; E 2 ) such that the reference string output by E 1 (1 k ) is statistically indistinguishable from D k . Furthermore, given ( ; ) E 1 (1 k ), if there exists two accepting conversations (a; c; z) and (a; c 0 ; z 0 ) with c 6 = c 0 for some given x 2L R , then E 2 (x; ; (a; c; z)) outputs w such that (x; w) 2 R. 20 Informally, one way to construct -protocols is as follows. Our common reference string will consist of a random public key pk for a semantically-secure encryption scheme. Then for a given (x; w) 2 R, we will construct an encryption e of w under key pk, and then construct a -protocol to prove that there is a w such that (x; w) 2 R and that e is an encryption of w.
As with -protocols, we will use the _ notation to denote an \OR" protocol, even if one or both of these protocols are -protocols.
C The Universal Composability Framework
In more detail, the execution in the real-life model and the ideal process proceeds basically as follows.
The environment Z drives the execution. It can provide input to a party P i or to the adversary, A or S. If P i is given an input, P i is activated. In the ideal process P i simply forwards the input directly to F (this is the \direct forwarding" that we discussed in the introduction), which is then activated, possibly writing messages on its outgoing communication tape, and then handing activation back to P i . In the real-life model, P i follows its protocol, either writing messages on its outgoing communication tape or giving an output to Z. Once P i is nished, Z is activated again. If the adversary is activated, it follows its protocol, possibly giving output to Z, and also either corrupting a party, or performing one of the following activities. If the adversary is A in the real-life model, it may deliver a message from the output communication tape of one honest party to another, or send a message on behalf of a corrupted party. If the adversary is S in the ideal process, it may deliver a message from F to a party, or send a message to F. If a party or F receives a message, it is activated, and once it nishes, Z is activated At the beginning of the execution, all participating entities are given the security parameter k 2 N and random bits. The environment is also given an auxiliary input z 2 f0; 1g . At the end of the execution, the environment outputs a single bit. Let REAL ;A;Z denote the distribution ensemble of random variables describing Z's output when interacting in the real-life model with adversary A and players running protocol , with input z, security parameter k, and uniformly-chosen random tapes for all participating entities. Let IDEAL F;S;Z denote the distribution ensemble of random variables 20 Notice that this extraction property is similar to that of weak special soundness of -protocols, where there exists an accepting conversation even for an invalid proof, but two accepting conversations guarantees that the proof is valid. Here, the extractor can always extract something from any conversation, but it might not be the witness if there is only one accepting conversation. However, having two accepting conversations sharing the same a guarantees that the extracted information is indeed a witness. describing Z's output after interacting with adversary S and ideal functionality F, with input z, security parameter k, and uniformly-chosen random tapes for all participating entities. To formulate the composition theorem, one must introduce a hybrid model, a real-life model with access to an ideal functionality F. In particular, this F-hybrid model functions like the real-life model, but where the parties may also exchange messages with an unbounded number of copies of F, each copy identi ed via a unique session identi er (sid). The communication between the parties and each one of these copies mimics the ideal process, and in particular the hybrid adversary does not have access to the contents of the messages. Let HYB F ;A;Z denote the distribution ensemble of random variables describing the output of Z, after interacting in the F-hybrid model with protocol . Let be a protocol in the F-hybrid model, and a protocol that secures realizes F. The composed protocol is now constructed by replacing the rst message to F in by an invocation of a new copy of , with fresh random input, the same sid, and with the contents of that message as input; each subsequent message to that copy of F is replaced with an activation of the corresponding copy of , with the contents of that message as new input to .
Canetti 6] proves the following composition theorem.
Theorem C.1 ( 6] ) Let F, G be ideal functionalities. Let be an n-party protocol that securely realizes G in the F-hybrid model, and let be an n-party protocol that securely realizes F. Then protocol securely realizes G.
D Proofs
We present the proofs to some of the theorems in the paper. First, we present the exclusive collision lemma to be used in some of the proofs. Unbounded ZK: By inspection, S 1 (1 k ) produces exactly the same distribution as the real protocol. Next, notice that S 0 runs S 2 only when (x; w) 2 R; that the trapdoor property of the SSTC scheme ensures that the faked commitment/decommitment are computationally indistinguishable from the real commitment/decommitment; and that protocol is honest-veri er ZK, and is thus witness indistinguishable. The unbounded ZK-ness follows from these facts by a straightforward hybrid argument.
Unbounded simulation soundness: The proof here is quite similar to the proof of unbounded simulation soundness of the USSZK construction in 31]. Roughly speaking, we prove that any adversary that breaks the unbounded simulation soundness of the ZK protocol can either be used to fake a signature for the strong one-time signature scheme or to open a commitment in two di erent ways. The rst case will violate the security of the strong one-time signature scheme, and the second case will violate the unbounded simulation soundness of the SSTC scheme. The basic argument is that for an adversary to break the unbounded simulation soundness, one of two cases must hold. The rst case is when the adversary creates a new proof accepted by the veri er that uses one of the public keys for the strong one-time signature scheme that were used by the simulator. In this case, for the transcript to be di erent, it must be that it signs a new transcript, and thus forges in the strong one-time signature scheme.
The second case is when the adversary uses a new public key for the strong one-time signature scheme. Then the adversary's commitment uses a new identi er. Recall that if x 6 2 L R , then for each rst message to there is at most one challenge that leads to an accepting conversation. This implies that if the adversary could answer two challenges, it must open its commitment in two di erent ways, breaking the simulation soundness of the commitment scheme. First, by the existential unforgeability property of SIG 1 , we show that the di erence between p and p 0 is negligible. We do this by constructing a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time attacker Next, we show that p 0 is negligible. We do so by constructing a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker B that breaks the simulation-sound binding property of the SSTC scheme TC with probability at least 0 = (p 0 ) 2 ? 2 ?k . The input to B is a public key pk for the SSTC scheme TC and a simulator S TC (sk) with the corresponding secret key, as in the de nition of the SSTC scheme (De nition 3.1). The breaker B runs the experiment Expt 1 A (k), running the simulator S and veri er V as normal, except for using pk as the common reference string. When S 2 needs to open a decommitment, B asks the supplied simulator S TC to do so. Before V sends a challenge to A 2 , B forks the experiment and continues independently in each sub-experiment (thus giving independent random challenges to A 2 ). Then B examines the output (x; tr 1 ; b 1 ) and (x; tr 2 ; b 2 ) in each sub-experiment. If b 1 = b 2 = 1 and x 6 2 L R (call this a successful sub-experiment), and also the challenges in each sub-experiment are distinct, then we conclude that the adversary A must have successfully decommitted to two di erent rst messages of protocol . In other words, A has produced (a 1 ; dec a 1 ) and (a 2 ; dec a 2 ) such that TCver(pk; com a ; a 1 ; sig vk; dec a 1 ) = 1 and TCver(pk; com a ; a 2 ; sig vk; dec a 2 ) = 1 for some com a . We know that it must be the case that a 1 6 = a 2 , since by weak special soundness of protocol , if x 6 2 L R , then there do not exist two accepting conversations with the same rst-message in . Now we determine the success probability of B. First note that for each sub-experiment, the view of A is perfectly indistinguishable from the view of A in Expt 1 A (k), and thus the probability of success in each sub-experiment is p 0 . Second, note that the probability of a random collision on k-bit challenges is 2 ?k . Then we can determine the success probability of B using Lemma D.1, as follows.
A is a random variable denoting possible runs of experiments up to the challenge from V. B a is a random variable denoting the remainder of a run of an experiment after initial part a in the support of A. For Formally, let be the -protocol in the construction of protocol^ with simulator S and extractor E = (E ;1 ; E ;2 ).
At the beginning of the ideal process, the ideal adversary S generates ( ; ) E ;1 (1 k ) and (pk; sk) R TCgen(1 k ), uses (pk; ) as the common reference string for F D CRS , and stores sk and .
During the ideal process, S runs a simulated copy of A. Messages received from Z are forwarded to the simulated A, and messages sent by the simulated A to its environment are forwarded to Z.
If S receives a message (ZK-PROOF; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x) fromF R ZK , i.e., P i is uncorrupted and has given a witness w toF R ZK such that (x; w) 2 R, then S simulates P i using the trapdoor property of the SSTC scheme. In particular, S generates ( g com; ) TCfakeCom(pk; sk; hP i ; P j i) and sends (x; g com)
to P j as the rst message. If P i receives a challenge c from P j , S simulates P i as follows. First it invokes the simulator S to obtain an accepting conversation (a; c; z) S (x; ; c). Then If P j is uncorrupted and receives a rst message from a prover P i , say for a value x in session ssid, then S simulates P j as in the actual protocol^ , i.e., it sends back a random challenge c. When P j receives the nal message (a; dec a ; z) in session ssid, S performs the veri cations speci ed in protocol (for the decommitment and -protocol ) and, if these pass, proceeds as follows.
1. If P i is uncorrupted, S forwards the message (ZK-PROOF; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x) to the actual uncorrupted P j .
2. If P i is corrupted, but S had previously received a message (ZK-PROOF; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x) from F R ZK | this happens when P i is corrupted during a UCZK protocol | then using the witness w that was revealed when P i was corrupted, S sends (zk-prover; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x; w) toF R ZK ; and forwards the response fromF R ZK to P j .
3. Otherwise, S runs the extractor E ;2 (x; ; (a; c; z)) which outputs a potential witness w. S sends (zk-prover; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x; w) toF R ZK ; and forwards any response fromF R ZK to P j . which implies our theorem.
First we de ne a new experiment Mix A;Z (k). Intuitively, this new experiment is a \mixture" of the hybrid model and the ideal process, in that an uncorrupted party acting as a prover is handled as in the ideal process (i.e., the trapdoor property of the commitment scheme is used to enable it the simulation of a prover in the -protocol), but an uncorrupted party acting as a veri er is handled as in the hybrid model (i.e., no extraction takes place). 21 More precisely, the experiment generates ( ; ) E ;1 (1 k ) 21 It may be tempting to switch these (i.e., in the mixed protocol, the prover is handled as in the hybrid protocol, and the veri er is handled as in the ideal protocol), and argue that simple trapdoor commitments would su ce. The argument would go as follows: (1) The output of the hybrid protocol and the mixed protocol would be indistinguishable, by the extraction property of the -protocol; and (2) The output of the mixed protocol and the ideal protocol would be indistinguishable, by the trapdoorness property of the trapdoor commitment protocol, and by the SHVZK property of the -protocol. However, this argument is awed. In particular, the SHVZK property does not hold if the adversary is also given access to the knowledge of whether the -protocol extractor is successful. In fact, the success/failure of this extractor distinguishes between a real prover's output and the SHVZK simulator's output. and (pk; sk) R TCgen(1 k ), and just as in the case of IDEALF R ZK ;S;Z , (pk; ) is used as the common reference string for F D CRS , and sk and are stored. Then the experiment runs simulated copies of Z and A. Messages sent by Z to the adversary are forwarded to A, and messages sent by A to its environment are forwarded to Z. If an uncorrupted party P i receives input (zk-prover; sid; ssid; P i ; P j ; x; w) from Z with (x; w) 2 R, it generates its messages in the same way as S above. Corruptions are handled in the same way as S above. An uncorrupted party P j responds to a prover as in the actual veri er protocol in^ . Finally, the output of Mix A;Z (k) is the output of Z. . We shall prove that is negligible. Notice that the only di erence between experiment Mix A;Z (k) and the ideal process is in the case when S is simulating an uncorrupted veri er P j , and attempts to extract a witness from a corrupted prover P i but fails.
Thus is a lower bound on the probability of failing to extract a witness.
Now we de ne an experiment ExptOne S;Z (k) that runs S and Z in the ideal process, returning 1 on the failure of S to extract a witness. By the discussion above, Pr ExptOne S;Z (k)] . Now say a session has index ( ; ) if it is the th session between prover P i and veri er P j , and (P i ; P j ) is the th di erent prover/veri er pair for which a session has been started. In this case, we say P i (P j ) is the prover (veri er) associated with index ( ; ). Let ExptOne ( ; ) S;Z (k) denote the same experiment as above, except that it returns 1 if and only if S fails to extract a witness for the rst time in the session with index ( ; ). (Note that we may assume this experiment halts and outputs 0 if, assuming P i and P j are the prover and veri er, respectively, associated with index ( ; ), P j is ever corrupted, P i is uncorrupted when P j receives the rst message in the session with index ( ; ), or the session with index ( ; ) nishes with a successful extraction.) Then if at most u sessions are started, it is easy to see that for some ( ; ) with ; 2 f1; : : : ; ug, Pr ExptOne ( ; ) S;Z (k)] =u 2 . Call the lexicographically rst such session index ( 0 ; 0 ).
Now let ExptTwo ( ; )
S;Z (k) denote the same experiment as above, except that if the prover P i associated with index ( ; ) is uncorrupted and starts a session with P j , then the challenge c from P j is chosen, an accepting conversation is produced by the simulator (a; c; z) S (x; ; c), the commitment/decommitment pair is produced for a as normal by (com a ; dec a ) TCcom(pk; a; hP i ; P j i), and (x; com a ) is sent to P j . If P j receives this message, it sends challenge c, and if P i receives this challenge, it responds using the z value computed by the simulator. Note that P i does not use the trapdoor property of the commitment scheme for tag hP i ; P j i, but it still simulates the -protocol exactly as in ExptOne ( ; ) S;Z (k). 22 By the trapdoor property of the commitment scheme, Pr ExptTwo ( 0 ; 0 ) S;Z (k)] , for some c =u 2 . Now we construct an adversary B that breaks the SSTC scheme TC with probability at least 2 ? 2 ?k . Since u is polynomial, this will imply that , and hence , is negligible. We describe the adversary B. Let B take a public key pk of TC along with its corresponding equivocation oracle. First B chooses random ; 2 f1; : : : ; ug, and then it runs ExptTwo ( ; ) S;Z (k) except for (1) changing the common reference string to include pk as the public key of the SSTC scheme, (2) having S use the equivocation oracle to fake commitments. Also, before sending a challenge in the session with index ( ; ) B forks the experiment and continues independently in each sub-experiment (i.e., sending random independent challenges in the session with index ( ; ) in each sub-experiment). Let be the 22 Note that we would not be able to complete the simulation if Pj were corrupted, but in this case the experiment would halt and output zero anyway. event that each sub-experiment halts and outputs 1, and the challenges in each sub-experiment are distinct. If occurs, then we know that A has decommitted di erently in the two sub-experiments. This is because of the extraction property of the -protocol: if A had decommitted in the same way, then there would exist two accepting conversations with the same rst-message, and a witness would have been extracted. Thus B has obtained two di erent decommitments for a commitment with tag hP i ; P j i. Note that by the authenticated channels assumption, since P j is uncorrupted, no other party could send a message ostensibly from P j . Then by the de nition of the experiment, the equivocation oracle is not called for the tag hP i ; P j i By Lemma D.1, Pr( ) 2 ? 2 ?k . Therefore, B breaks the SSTC scheme TC with probability at least 2 ? 2 ?k , as claimed above.
E Signature Scheme De nitions
A signature scheme SIG is a triple (sig gen; sig sign; sig verify) of algorithms, the rst two being probabilistic, and all running in polynomial time (with a negligible probability of failing). sig gen takes as input 1 k and outputs a public key pair (sig vk; sig sk), i.e., (sig vk; sig sk) sig gen(1 k ). sig sign takes a message m and a secret key sig sk as input and outputs a signature for m, i.e., sig sign(sk; m). sig verify takes a message m, a public key vk, and a candidate signature 0 for m as input and returns the bit b = 1 if 0 is a valid signature for m for the corresponding private key, and otherwise returns the bit b = 0. That is, b sig verify(sig vk; m; 0 ). Naturally, if sig sign(sig sk; m), then sig verify(sig vk; m; ) = 1.
Security for signature schemes We specify existential unforgeability against adaptive chosenmessage attacks 35] for a signature scheme SIG = (sig gen; sig sign; sig verify). A forger is given sig vk, where (sig vk; sig sk) sig gen(1 k ), and tries to forge signatures with respect to sig vk. It is allowed to query a signature oracle (with respect to sig sk) on messages of its choice. It succeeds if after this it can output a valid forgery (m; ), where sig verify(sig vk; m; ) = 1, but m was not one of the messages signed by the signature oracle. We say a forger (t; q; )-breaks a scheme if the forger runs in time t(k) makes q(k) queries to the signature oracle, and succeeds with probability at least (k). A signature scheme SIG is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks if for all t and q polynomial in k, if a forger (t; q; )-breaks SIG, then is negligible in k.
In a one-time signature scheme, security is formulated as above except that the adversary may only query the signature oracle once, and we call it \existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks," since the term \adaptive" only makes sense with multiple queries. We note that onetime signatures scheme can be made very e cient since they don't need public-key cryptographic operations 24]. In a strong one-time signature scheme 47], we require that a forger is not even able to produce a di erent valid signature on a message that was signed by the signature oracle. A strong one-time signature scheme can be constructed from any one-way function 47].
F Number-Theoretic Assumptions
We review some of the number-theoretic assumptions used in this paper.
The Strong RSA assumption. The Strong RSA assumption is a generalization of the standard RSA assumption which (informally) states that given an RSA modulus N and an exponent e, it is computationally infeasible to nd the e-th root of a random x. Informally, the strong-RSA assumption states that it is infeasible to nd an arbitrary non-trivial root of a random x.
More formally, we say that p is a safe prime if both p and (p?1)=2 are prime. Then let RSA-Gen(1 k ) be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that generates two random k=2-bit safe primes p and q, and outputs N pq. Assumption F.1 (Strong-RSA) For any non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-size circuit A, the following probability is negligible in k:
Pr N RSA-Gen(1 k ); x Z N ; (y; e) A(1 k ; x; N) : y e x mod N^e 2]
The Strong RSA assumption was introduced by Bari c and P tzmann 1], and has been used in several applications (see 30, 32, 14] ). It is a stronger assumption than the \standard" RSA assumption, yet no method is known for breaking it other than factoring N.
The Cramer-Shoup Signature Scheme Cramer and Shoup 14] presented an e cient signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the Strong RSA Assumption, formally de ned in Appendix F. In addition to the main security parameter k, they use a secondary security parameter k 0 for public key modulus size. 23 The value k 0 is dependent on k and is set so that known attacks on public key systems with modulus size k 0 are at least as hard as known attacks on hash functions and other brute-force attacks on systems with main security parameter k. Here we describe their scheme, which we denote SIG CS = (sig gen CS ; sig sign CS ; sig verify CS ). 24 sig gen CS (1 k As a technical note, instead of an expected polynomial-time algorithm for prime generation, we assume a probabilistic strict polynomial-time algorithm that has a negligible probability of failing. This has no e ect on the following security result. Theorem F.2 ( 14] ) The Cramer-Shoup signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-message attack, under the Strong RSA Assumption and the assumption that H is collision-resistant. 23 For today's technology, reasonable values may be k = 256 and k 0 = 1024. 24 Some technical notations: a prime number p is a safe prime, if (p ? 1)=2 is also a prime number. SafePrime (1 n ) is the set of all n-bit safe prime numbers; Prime (1 n ) is the set of all n-bit prime numbers; QRN is the set of all quadratic residues in Z N , and Hash (1 n ) is a set of e cient hash functions that maps strings of arbitrary length to an n-bit string.
DSA The Digital Signature Algorithm 37] was proposed by NIST in April 1991, and in May 1994 was adopted as a standard digital signature scheme in the U. If 0 < r 0 < q, 0 < s < q, and r 0 ((g H(m) y r 0 ) s ?1 mod q mod p) mod q, return 1, else return 0.
The security of DSA intuitively rests on the hardness of computing discrete logarithms, but there is no known security reduction that proves this. However, it is often simply assumed that DSA is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attack. 25 In the DSA standard, k, k 0 , and H are xed in the following way: k = 160, k 0 is set to a multiple of 64 between 512 and 1024, inclusive, and hash function H is de ned as SHA- 1 27] . However, we will use these parameters as if they could be varied according to the security level desired.
